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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
REMINGTON-RAND, INC., a cor-
poration, Respondent and Plaintiff, 
VS. 
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S. 
MACHADO, fdba A - Typewriter 
Company, Defendants, 
vs. 
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH 
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a 
corporation, 
Appellants and Garnishee Defendants. 
No. 8379 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
On January 24, 1955, Remington-Rand, Inc. was awarded 
a Judgment by Default against defendant Thurman E. O'Neil 
in Case No. 10403·8 in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
Cou_nty, State of Utah, in the sum of $4,243.82, and costs, 
for merchandise theretofore delivered to Thurman E. O'Neil 
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while operating a business known as A-1 Typewriter Com-
pany at Provo, Utah (R. 19). 
Thereafter, on March 18, 1955, two separate garnishments 
were served upon appellants, Dale E. Grant and Utah Cash 
Register Exchange, Inc. requesting them to make regular 
answers concerning any indebtedness, etc. between O'Neil 
and appellants (R. 11, 13). 
Thereupon, Dale E. Grant made negative answers on all 
questions and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. admitted 
that it had certain property in its possession, consisting of 
work benches, a compressor and miscellaneous tools and 
equipment (R. 16) which it understood belonged to O'Neil, 
but upon which E. F. White (one of plaintiff's witnesses here-
inafter referred to) had a security interest under a Bill of 
Sale from O'Neil. 
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was a small corpora-
tion which was located at 141 East 2nd South Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and was engaged in the business of selling and 
servicing cash register machines and similar allied office equip-
ment. Dale E. Grant was its principal stockholder and was 
also president of the corporation. 
About ten (10) days after sending the Answers to Gar-
nishment to plaintiffs, a single instrument entitled "Notice" 
was received by app~llants, stating that on April 18, 1955, 
(thirteen days thereafter) that (R. 21)-
..... plaintiff will call up in the Law and Motion 
Division of the above-entitled Court, a hearing to de-
termine the indebtedness, if any, due Thurman E. 
O'Neil by the garnishees above." 
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On April 16, 1955, appellant Dale E. Grant was served 
with a subpoena to appear on April 18 as a witness on the 
part of the plaintiff and was paid a $6.20 witness fee. In 
obedience therewith he appeared, accompanied by counsel, and 
listened to and participated in a hearing which, at its conclu-
sion, resulted in a personal judgment against both Utah Cash 
Register Exchange, Inc., and himself for $3,600.00 and costs. 
Although appellants have to this time been unable to 
ascertain what happened, it appears as if plaintiff proceeded at 
the hearing on the basis of a "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" 
which was filed in the proceedings, but which was never 
served on appellants. However, a "Reply to Answers of Gar-
nishees" was actually served on T. E. O'Neil on or about 
April 5, 1955, at the same time the "Notice" was received 
by these appellants. 
A search of the record (R. 34-35) does not indicate service 
of the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" upon anyone. Al-
though appellants knew that O'Neil had received such an 
instrument, its exact contents were not known to them prior 
to the hearing. 
A.t the "hearing", the plaintiff put on evidence and Dale 
E. Grant took the stand and testified in accordance with the 
appellants' answers to garnishments. At its conclusion the 
Court announced its decision and promptly arose and left 
the Courtroom while appellants, dumbfounded, wondered what 
had happened. 
The first Garnishee Judgment was against Dale E. Grant 
alone (R. 17-18). Later this judgment was set aside as un-
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supported by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as 
required by Rule 64 D (h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
a new "Amended Judgment" was entered against both Dale 
E. ~nt and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., nunc pro tunc 
(R. 1). The Findings of Fact (R. 5-6) purporting to support 
the "Amended Judgment" were later amended upon motion of 
appellants. 
NATURE OF TI-lE CASE 
The matter before this Court primarily involves pro-
cedural due process under the Constitutions of the State of 
Utah and the United States. There is no question but what a 
"hearing" was had in the matter, but whether the "Notice" 
which was given was sufficient to satisfy due process of law 
is what this Court must decide. Also, the questions of whether 
appellants were accorded a fair opportunity to demand a trial 
by jury and to take advantage of the various defensive pre-
trial preparation procedures provided by our Rules of Civil 
Procedure are present in this appeal. 
A further point is presented by the proceedings, namely: 
Did the District Court have jurisdiction to grant plaintiff any 
judgment exceeding that provided by Rule 64 D ( i) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which basically provides that upon 
failure of the plaintiff to reply, judgment shall be entered con-
sistent with the answers of the garnishee. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellants submit the following points as reasons for seek-
ing a reversal of the judgment of the lower court: 
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(1) 
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A TRIAL 
BY JURY, OR A FAIR TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY, BE-
CAUSE THEY WERE NOT SERVED WITH NOTICE, AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 64 D(h), URCP, THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS PROCEEDING AT THE HEARING HELD APRIL 
18, 1955, ON THE THEORY AND ALLEGATIONS OF 
ITS "REPLY TO ANSWERS TO GARNISHEES" WHICH 
WAS NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANTS. 
(II) 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT JURISDIC-
TION TO MAKE AND ENTER ANY JUDGMENT EX-
CEEDING THAT ALLOWABLE UNDER THE ANSWERS 
OF THESE DEFENDANTS TO THE GARNISHMENTS 
SERVED UPON THEM, AND AS PROVIDED FOR BY 
RULE 64 D(i), URCP. 
(III) 
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH 
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER 
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, AND THAT DALE E. GRANT 
SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT 
WHICH WAS ENTERED IN THE GARNISHMENT PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
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ARGUMENT 
(1) 
APPELLANTS WERE DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A TRIAL 
BY JURY, OR A FAIR TRIAL WITHOUT A JURY, BE-
CAUSE THEY WERE NOT SERVED WITH NOTICE, AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 64 D(h), URCP, THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS PROCEEDING AT THE HEARING HELD APRIL 
18, 1955, ON THE THEORY AND ALLEGATIONS OF 
ITS "REPLY TO ANSWERS TO GARNISHEES" WHICH 
WAS NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANTS. 
When appellants received the April 5th notice of the 
hearing to be held less than two weeks later, O'Neil also re-
ceived such a notice, together with the "Reply to Answers 
of Garnishees." Being unaware of the contents of the papers 
served on O'Neil or what role O'Neil was to play, appellant 
Dale E. Grant went to the "hearing" on April 18, 1955, with 
his attorney. When objections to the procedure were raised, 
he stated in his affidavit (R. 26) that he would not have had 
any particular reason to personally attend the hearing except 
to clarify any questions arising out of his Answers to Garnish-
ments (R. 26) : 
"Your affiant further represents that he has never 
had any objection to plaintiff recovering from him, 
pursuant to a court Order, those items of personal prop-
erty belonging to defendant O'Neil which your affiant 
had in his custody as President of Utah Cash Register 
Exchange, Inc., and that he appeared in Court for 
the primary purpose of so informing the Court of the 
same; that he was Subpoened to appear in Court by 
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the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, and was paid 
the regular witness fee of $6.20; that the documents 
submitted on his behalf as exhibits in said hearing were 
ordered to be brought to Court by your affiant pursuant 
to the subpoena served upon him by the plaintiff in 
said action; that he did not appear in Court-either 
through himself or his counsel-prepared or informed 
that any attempt would be made to charge him per-
sonally with any purported or alleged debts due to 
Thurman E. O'Neil as an alter ego of Utah Cash Reg-
ister Exchange, Inc." 
That Grant appeared and so testified is evidenced from 
his testimony at the hearing (R. 76): 
Q. Is it satisfactory with you if Remington-Rand takes 
possession through the sheriff and sells some of that 
equipment? 
A. Absolutely, it is all right. 
Q. Could you tell the Court what equipment is on the 
premises ·to which you claim no interest that be-
longs to Mr. O'Neil or to him and others? 
A. I think I can tell most of it as I remember that. 
There was the compressor, air compressor, a vat of 
cleaning-or vat machine, some parts cabinets with 
parts and some Cole cabinets, file cabinets, file, 
desk; there were two used machines they sent. There 
was a question of who owned one between T. E. 
O'Neil and E. F. White. They were on E. F. White's 
Bill of Sale. 
Q. And as to these items, you claim no interest? 
A. No interest whatsoever. 
Q. And are those the items to which you made refer-
ence in the answers to the garnishment served upon 
you? 
A. Yes. 
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At the conclusion of the hearing the Judge announced 
that Dale E. Grant was indebted to O'Neil in the sum of 
$3,600.00, and that judgment would issue binding Dale E. 
Grant personally, because Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. 
was his alter ego. The Judge then forthwith arose from the 
bench and proceeded to chambers without entertaining any 
further comment. It was only afterwards when appellant and 
his counsel examined the file that it became fully clear that 
the appellants had been submitted to an actual trial on the 
rrReply to Answers to Garnishment" which had never been 
served on them! 
A further inspection of the file revealed that the evidence 
introduced did not even follow the theory of the "Reply to 
Answers of Garnishees" in that-
( 1) The Reply stated (R. 34) that the sum of $3,600.00 
was asserted therein as a transfer of a stock of merchandise, 
apparently in violation of the Bulk Sales Act; whereas the con-
troverted evidence submitted by witnesses for the plaintiff 
was clearly to the effect that O'Neil purp,<?rtedly loaned money 
to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., after its incorporation 
(R. 49), that title to none of O'Neil's goods were transferred 
to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., and that plaintiff's wit-
ness E. L. White actually held a Bill of Sale to the merchandise 
appellants actually did have in their possession. 
Q. Now, Mr. Snyder, you show here the figure 
$3,020.00 as owed to Mr. O'Neil. What does that 
represent? 
A. That represents the money that O'Neil gave Mr. 
Grant to pay off a certain mortgage, chattel mort-
gage at Farmers State Bank. 
10 
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Similar and further testimony can be found on pages 45, 46, 
47 and 60. 
( 2) In the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" it was as-
serted that O'Neil was a fifty percent "partner" in the business 
with Grant (R. 34), whereas Snyder testified quite to the con-
trary on behalf of the plaintiff (R. 53) : 
Q. And then am I correct in assuming that this was 
simply a matter of how much money was owed 
to you and O'Neil by Utah Cash Register? 
A. And others. 
Q. And others. Am I correct in that? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And it did not involve an ownership arrangement 
then? 
A. Only to the point of the merchandise involved. 
Q. But by that I mean there was nothing discussed as 
to whether you or O'Neil owned part of the Utah 
Cash Register Exchange as a result of that, was 
there? 
A. Nothing was discussed other than what transpired 
earlier. 
( 3) The "Reply to Answers of Garnishees" contended 
that Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was the alter ego of 
appellant Dale E. Grant (R. 34), organized for the purpose 
of defrauding creditors of O'Neil; however, Snyder again on 
behalf of plaintiff, testified as follows (R. 46): 
Q. Were you present at conversations between Mr. 
Grant and his attorney preceding the incorporation 
of Utah Cash Register? 
11 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And did Mr. Grant on that occasion state the reason 
for the incorporation of Utah Cash Register? 
A. Well, I presume limited liability is the understand-
ing that I had out of the conversation. 
Further, the money allegedly loaned to Utah Cash Regis-
ter Exchange, Inc., was claimed to have been secured by sales 
of merchandise by O'Neil and Snyder long after incorporation 
(R. 55). 
Appellant has as yet been unable to satisfactorily de-
termine under what theory, basis or ground plaintiff was pro-
ceeding in the hearing. 
There is no need to cite cases concerning the requirements 
of procedural due process of law under Section 7 of Article I 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah or under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Due process of law contemplates notice and an opportunity 
to be heard. True, an opportunity was had for a hearing in the 
matter before the Court, and an instrument purporting to be 
a "Notice" was given. But it is submitted that the "Notice" 
contained nothing sufficient to inform appellants of the true 
nature of the proceedings brought before the Court. If any-
thing, the "Notice" served to mislead appellants as to the 
nature of the relief being sought. Certainly, there was nothing 
in the "Notice" to inform appellants, partic~larly appellant 
Dale E. Grant, that an attempt would be made to hold him 
personally liable on the ground that the corporation was his 
alter ego. 
12 
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Appellants believe that the record so clearly shows a com-
plete failure of giving reasonable notice that the need for 
quoting extensive authority is considered wholly unnecessary. 
Another interesting observation to be made concerning 
the entire proceeding is that Section 64 D (h) of our U tab Rules 
of Civil Procedure specifically affords a jury trial in such 
actions. 
(h) Reply to Answer of Garnishee; Trial of Issues; 
Judgment. 
" ... the matter thus at issue shall be tried in the 
same manner as other issues of like nature. Judgment 
shall be entered upon the verdict or finding the same 
as if the garnishee had answered according to such 
verdict or finding. Costs shall be awarded in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 54( d)." 
Appellants submit that the form and substance of the 
"Notice"-besides having the matter set in the Law and Mo-
tion Division of the Third District Court within thirteen 
( 13) days-deprived them of the kind of notice that would 
have reasonably informed them that they might demand a jury 
trial and that they should ·utilize the various remedies afforded 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procudure for depositions, inter-
rogatories and other pre-trial discovery techniques. See anno-
tation in 88 ALR beginning at page 1148. 
It is submitted that garnishment hearings, particularly if 
the garnishee demands the same, should be set on the trial 
calendar and not heard in the Law and Motion Division of the 
Court. 
13 
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(II) 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY WAS WITHOUT JURISDIC-
TION TO MAKE AND ENTER ANY JUDGMENT EX-
CEEDING THAT ALLOWABLE UNDER THE ANSWERS 
OF THESE DEFENDANTS TO THE GARNISHMENTS 
SERVED UPON THEM, AND AS PROVIDED FOR BY 
RULE 64 D(i), URCP. 
Rule 64 D (h) further provides as follows: 
" ... if the garnishee answers, the plaintiff may, 
within 10 days after the expiration of the time allowed 
for the filing of such answer, serve upon the garnishee 
and file a reply to the whole or any part thereof; and 
may also allege any matters which would charge the 
garnishee with liability . . . " 
It is submitted that the failure of plaintiff to serve the 
Reply upon the garnishees is jurisdictional, and that because 
of plaintiff's failure the Court had no jurisdiction to make and 
enter judgment in the absence· of a clear showing that appel-
lants were fully informed of the proceedings, nor did it have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter upon which it passed judg-
ment. It can hardly be argued that the Court should hear a 
matter involving a Reply to Answers of Garnishees when in 
fact one of the garnishees appeared pursuant to Subpoena and 
for purposes consistent with Rule 64 (D) (i), URCP. 
Appellant appeared pursuant to subpoena and for the 
purpose of informing the Court that Utah Cash Register Ex-
change, Inc. had no objection to the plaintiff's taking such 
equipment from its premises as was owned by O'Neil and 
14 
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White. He also expected to give whatever information concern-
ing the personal property which was levied upon as was de-
sired of him. His affidavit was clearly to such effect (R. 26). 
Appellants could have fully expected judgment to be 
entered consistent only with Rule 64 D(i), URCP: 
Judgment on Answer to Garnishee. 
If the plaintiff fails to reply to the answer of the 
garnishee, he shall be deemed to have accepted it as 
correct, and judgment may be entered thereon ... In 
no event shall the garnishee be chargeable with costs, 
except under the provisions of subdivisions (h) and 
(j) of this Rule. 
(III) 
NO EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH 
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER 
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, AND THAT DALE E. GRANT 
SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THE JUDGMENT 
WHICH WAS ENTERED IN THE GARNISHMENT PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
The plaintiff's irregular method of proceeding at the 
hearing is once again drawn into sharp focus when one at-
tempts to determine whether plaintiff was trying to hold ap-
pellant Dale E. Grant personally liable simply because Grant 
allegedly owed money to O'Neil, or whether plaintiff intended 
to hold Dale E. Grant liable on the theory that the corporation 
of which he was president and the principal stockholder was 
his alter ego. 
15 
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Appellants submit that nothing can be found in the record 
to support any finding or conclusion that Utah Cash Register 
Exchange, Inc. was the alter ego of Dale E. Grant. The evi-
dence introduced by plaintiff was entirely to the contrary. Ref-
erence to some of the evidence has heretofore been made in 
former portions of this brief. 
From 1 ALR 611 the basic law is stated: 
" ... Ordinarily, corporate existence cannot be dis-
regarded. The exceptions to this rule are few." 
Plaintiff's witness Snyder readily admitted (R. 46) that 
his conclusion concerning the purpose of forming the cor-
poration, while being present at the time of the discussion, 
was that rrlimited liability is the ·understanding that I had out 
of the conversation." There is nothing in Snyder's testimony 
or in any other portion of the record that slightly or remotely 
indicates that the corporation was formed for the purpose 
of defrauding creditors of O'Neil or of Grant, or that any 
other illegal purpose was present. To secure limited liability 
is certainly a proper legal purpose and reason for using the 
corporate device for doing business. 
The basis upon which judgment was entered seemed to 
be that by some manner of dealing-which plaintiff's evidence 
did not make clear-Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. became 
indebted to O'Neil in the amount of $3,000.00, either because 
of a cash contribution which O'Neil was to have made to the 
business (R. 45), or a loan to the business of a similar amount 
(R. 49). In any event, an inspection of the testimony on 
pages 45, 47, and 49 of the record clearly shows that anything 
16 
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O'Neil may have put into the business was cash which he 
personally acquired separate and apart from any dealings with 
or on behalf of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., or Dale 
E. Grant, and that the money was derived from sales of his 
own merchandise while being assisted by plaintiff's own wit-
nesses Snyder and White. 
Since title to no property was actually ever transferred to 
the corporation in violation of the Bulk Sales Act, what differ-
ence would it make whether Grant or the corporation itself 
allegedly owed O'Neil in the absence of a showing of some 
sort of a collusive plan at the time of incorporation? Unless 
a reason appears, and unless the corporation was initially 
Grant's alter ego, why should Grant be held liable for the 
corporation's doings? This premise becomes clear when we 
consider that the corporation was formed in July (R. 46), 
it officially began business on August 1 (R. 47), but the sale 
of O'Neil's goods from which money was allegedly loaned 
or transferred to Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. arose 
from sales which occurred in the latter part of August and 
September (R. 55). And as to these sales the record is con-
clusive that neither Grant nor Utah Cash Register Exchange, 
Inc. took any part in the same, yet the Court entered judgment 
against both appellants. 
An examination of the testimony and the remainder of 
the record cannot produce the slightest indication of any evi-
dence tending to support a finding that the corporation was 
originally formed as the alter ego for Dale E. Grant to effectu-
ate a transfer of property from O'Neil to the corporation in 
violation of the Bulk Sales Act, or to otherwise defraud credi-
17 
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tors or to evade the law in any respect. Nor does anythin1 
in the record give the Court any b~sis for making a findin1 
that Dale E. Grant was operating individually under the alte 
ego of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. during the tim 
of the transactions referred to in the testimony while beinJ 
president of the Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. 
To further substantiate the foregoing argument, appellant: 
submit that respondent cannot possibly show any form o: 
notice sufficient to inform appellant Dale E. Grant that h~ 
was being brought into Court to answer a charge that th~ 
corporation of which he was president was his alter ego. I 
is believed this point has been sufficiently covered heretofore 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is squarely confronted with the problem o 
deciding whether the Utah Rules of Civil Procudure mea1 
what they say, or whether the Court should once again engraf 
exceptions upon the mandate of the rules, thus encouragin1 
a too prevalent practice among many members of the Bar b 
treat Court procedure as some some om a necessary evil t1 
be dispensed with by sleight of hand. 
The writer wishes it to be understood that the foregoin, 
criticism is not leveled at counsel for respondent, particularl 
since the failure to serve the "Reply to Answers of Garnishees 
on appellants has all of the ear-marl<s of an inter-office cleriG 
error. But to charge appellants with the results of the errc 
is something which this Court should not lightly dismiss. 
18 
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Appellants fully recognize that an appellate court could, 
even in this case, probably reason itself into a position of hold-
ing that upon some approach to the matter due process of 
law and other matters raised herein were satisfied to the extent 
of granting substantial justice to appellants. But such an ap-
proach would necessarily have to assume facts and matters 
which might be entirely inaccurate and contrary to the true 
situation. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in and of themselves 
are designed for liberality. But when they are not followed at 
all, or when whatever attempt to follow them is improper 
and actually misleads the other side of the litigation, it is time 
to draw the line. 
It is submitted that the "Amended Judgment" should be 
set aside and the decison of the lower Court should be 
reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
Attorney for Appellants 
;,z Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Notwithstanding all of our eff0rts to eliminate 
technicalities and l·ibE:ral ize procedure, we must 
Mol 1 o s e s i g h t of the card i n a I p r i n c i p I e 1· hat under 
our s y s t em o f j us t i c e , i f an i s s u e i s t o ·b e t r i e d 
tn d a p a r t y ' s r i g h t s con c I u de d w i t h res p e c t t h e r e to : fie must have not i c e t hereof and an o p port u n i t y to 
ltte t i t • " 
Mr~ Justice Crockett in National Farmers 
Uri ion ProQ_. C..· Cos. Co _y_.-Thomps.on 286 
P':---2rid-249 (Utah-- J u I y 12, 19 55) 
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